The effectiveness of cooperative advertising programs is studied in a market where two competing manufacturers deal with an exclusive retailer and two products. Two twostage game theoretic models are developed to analyze the long-term effects of retailer's promotions, which can be positive or negative, on the effectiveness of cooperative advertising. Closed-form equilibrium solutions are obtained and compared. We find that the level of product substitutability and the sign and magnitude of the long-term effects of retailer's promotions on sales determine whether cooperative advertising should be offered and accepted by the manufacturers and retailer. In particular, depending on the level of product substitutability, cooperative advertising can benefit both the manufacturers and retailer even when retailer's promotions negatively affects future sales.
On the other hand, some retailers choose not to participate in manufacturers' cooperative advertising programs.
There is an extensive number of works that look at the benefits of cooperative advertising for channel members. Aust and Buscher (2014) and Jørgensen and Zaccour (2014) provide two comprehensive reviews of this literature. The majority of these works uses static games and investigates cooperative advertising in bilateral monopoly contexts, where a manufacturer sells her product to a single retailer. The main finding of these static models is that cooperative advertising can be effective in boosting retailer's advertising, expanding demand, and ultimately increasing profits for each channel member (e.g., Dant cooperative advertising rates. They find that these programs do not benefit the channel if they lead to a significant decrease in the channel members' unit margins.
Considering only advertising decisions, and modeling the dynamic effects of advertising in a channel with competing retailers, other papers have studied the effects of differential cooperative advertising rates (e.g., He et al. 2011; Chutani and Sethi 2012) . They show that the retailers might not benefit from cooperative advertising taking into account advertising decisions in their model. Adding pricing decisions while considering a fixed total market demand, Chutani and Sethi (2014) show (numerically) that cooperative advertising does not benefit competing retailers.
These findings point to three important takeaways. First, while cooperative advertising is shown to be beneficial for firms in bilateral monopolistic channels, this result does not always hold in markets where at least one channel member faces competition. Second, it is important to model pricing decisions in addition to the retailers' marketing efforts when assessing the effectiveness of cooperative advertising. This is because these programs impact the channel members' unit margins, which in turn affects the profitability of cooperative advertising.
Third, the long-term effects on demand matter, especially when retailer's promotions can harm the brand image over time and competitive interactions in the channel are modeled. We obtain closed-form feedback Stackelberg equilibrium solutions for two games. Comparison of equilibrium profits shows that, under some identified conditions that depend on the nature (long-term effects) of retail promotions and the degree of product substitutability, the retailer should refuse to participate in the manufacturers' cooperative advertising programs, while, in others, the manufacturers should not offer cooperative advertising programs even if they can maximize total channel profits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we present the model for symmetric manufacturers, then we discuss the equilibrium solutions obtained for the NCA and CA games. Next, we compare equilibrium solutions across games to evaluate the effectiveness of the cooperative advertising program and extend the analysis to asymmetric manufacturers. Finally, we conclude and discuss managerial implications.
The model
We consider a channel where two competing manufacturers are selling substitutable products through a common retailer. The channel members make their decisions over a two-period horizon. In each period, the manufacturers are channel leaders; i.e., they simultaneously set their decisions for that period prior to the retailer. In period 1, the retailer decides of his promotions for the manufacturers' products (a i1 > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}). These consist in a variety of promotional activities and can include flyers, displays, local advertising, etc. The retailer also decides simultaneously of his consumer prices for the manufacturers' products in period 1 (p i1 > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}). Each manufacturer i sets her wholesale price in period 1 (w i1 > 0). Additionally, she can choose to share the cost of the retailer's promotions for her brand in period 1 by offering a cooperative advertising program where she reimburses the retailer's promotional costs associated with her product at a rate s i ∈ (0, 1). In period 2, the manufacturers set their wholesale prices (w i2 > 0) and the retailer sets his retail prices for each product i (p i2 > 0).
As in Liu et al. (2014) , we assume the following consumer-derived demand functions, d ij ,
for each product i in each period j and for i, j ∈ {1, 2} :
The parameter g is positive and represents the baseline demand (accumulated brand equity) for each product when no brand is being advertised and product substitutability is null. We assume that both products have the same baseline demand mainly to simplify the model. It means that the two competing firms have the same original market power. This assumption will be relaxed later to assess the generalizability of our findings. The parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of substitutability or the intensity of competition between the two products. In the extreme retail promotions where θ = 0, the two products are independent and, consequently, their demand functions are only affected by their own promotional and/or pricing decisions. These demand functions are derived from maximization of the consumer utility function developed by Spence (1976) 
retailers primarily invest in promotions to boost sales in the short run, it is now empirically proven that retail promotions also affect sales in the long run ( 
In period 2, manufacturer i's profit function, M i2 for i ∈ {1, 2}, and the retailer's profit for both products, R 2 , are as follow:
The retailer keeps no stocks and orders in each period the quantities that correspond to the demand of each of the two products. This assumption allows the manufacturers to reward the retailer for effective sales rather than for quantities purchased (Martín-Herrán et al. 2010). The channel members make their decisions in the following sequence. In each period, the two manufacturers play Nash together and Stackelberg with the retailer. More specifically, in period 1, the manufacturers decide simultaneously of their wholesale prices and of their cooperative advertising rates (if any). Then the retailer chooses his first period's pricing and promotional decisions simultaneously for both manufacturers' products, knowing the manufacturers' first period decisions. This is based on the observation that retailers are usually aware of manufacturers' pricing and cooperative advertising offers when they make their promotional and pricing decisions. In period 2, the manufacturers choose their wholesale prices simultaneously, knowing all the decisions made in period 1 by all channel members. Finally, the retailer sets simultaneously his prices in period 2 for both products knowing all decisions made in period 1 as well as the manufacturers' wholesale prices in period 2.
Equilibrium solutions
We obtain feedback equilibrium solutions using backwards induction for the following two Given the complexity of the analytical solutions and the conditions specifying interior and concavity conditions, we illustrate the analytical results we obtain in figures. In all these figures, we allow the parameters α and θ to vary in acceptable ranges (as explained below), while normalizing the baseline demand parameter, g, to 1 without loss of generality. We emphasize that all results obtained and discussed hereafter are based on analytical findings not on numerical analysis and that the figures are used as a way to simplify exposition of our results.
We obtain a unique equilibrium solution for the NCA game, while two equilibrium solutions denoted by Scenario I and Scenario II are derived for the CA game (See the Appendix for details). In Figure 1 below, we characterize the feasible domains for these three equilibrium solutions. Particularly, we identify the values of the model parameters (α and θ) for which the following conditions are verified. First, for each equilibrium, the corresponding players' decisions, margins, profits and demands are positive. Second, the manufacturers' participation rates are lower than one in the two scenarios of the CA game. Third and final, the concavity conditions ensuring that the extremum are interior maximum for the two games are satisfied. the market due to his/her inability to cope with the market conditions. This is the case in Figure 1 for products that are highly substitutable. Due to the heavy competitive pressure, the manufacturers are forced to set very low (even negative) wholesale prices or/and offer cooperative advertising programs that cover more than the retailer's advertising expenses.
As we can see, in the biggest area of the parameter space, the equilibrium solutions of the NCA and CA (Scenarios I or II) games are simultaneously feasible (dark red-colored region). In this large area, the players can play any of the three equilibria. There are two areas where only one of the two games can be played alone. The NCA can be played alone when the products are substantially substitutable (θ > 0.6) and retail promotions heavily increase long-term sales (light red-colored region). Scenario I of the CA game can be played alone when the products are highly substitutable (θ > 0.7) and retail promotions heavily damage long-term sales (yellow-colored region in Figure 1 ). There are also two other areas in which only Scenario I of the CA game and the NCA game are feasible (green-colored regions).
These areas are characterized by either low levels of product substitutability (θ < 0.45) and very damaging long-term effects of retail promotions (α < −0.82), or relatively high levels of product substitutability (θ ∈ (0.57, 0.72)).
Observe that for the CA game, Scenario I is feasible in a larger area than Scenario II, which means that in some areas, only Scenario I can be played, and in others the two scenarios will be considered. 
Effectiveness cooperative advertising programs
To assess the effectiveness of the cooperative advertising program, we compare the equilibrium profits obtained in the NCA and CA games for the manufacturers, retailer, and the total channel over the two periods. Profit comparisons are conducted in the feasible domain for both the NCA and CA games (see Figures 3-6 ).
Effects of cooperative advertising programs on the manufacturers' profits
We now examine whether or not two competing profit-maximizing manufacturers should offer cooperative advertising programs to their common retailer. To address this issue, we compare the manufacturers' optimal profits in the CA (Scenarios I and II) and NCA games. The findings of our analysis are summarized in Figure 3 . Figure 3 shows that in most areas of the feasible parameter space, the manufacturers are better off when they offer cooperative advertising programs to the retailer than when they do not (light blue-colored area). Thus, within this feasible domain, competing manufacturers may well offer cooperative advertising programs to a single retailer whether the retailer's promotion positively or negatively affects the long-term sales of their respective products.
Two notable exceptions exist where manufacturers find it optimal not to offer cooperative advertising programs (both green-colored areas). In the first case, the retailer promotions significantly damage sales in the next period (α < −0.82) and the products are highly differentiated (θ < 0.15). This is because for highly differentiated products, manufacturers act as quasi monopolists and use cooperative advertising offerings to substantially increase wholesale prices to alleviate the negative effects of retailer promotions on the second-period sales. As a consequence, the retailer also increases first-period retail prices, although its margins decrease. These players' strategies negatively affect the first-period demands and manufacturers' profits, which cannot be compensated in the second period (see Figures 7-9 in the Appendix for detailed analyses of demands and players' strategies). In the second case, the intensity of competition is relatively high (θ ∈ (0.56, 0.68)) regardless of the nature of the long-term effects of retail promotions. Cooperative advertising programs intensify price competition and manufacturers have no choice but to decrease their first-period wholesale prices. The first-period demands increase, but the loss in the first-period margins for manufacturers is detrimental to their profits. 
Effects of cooperative advertising programs on the retailer's profits
To assess the acceptability of the manufacturers' proposed cooperative advertising programs for the retailer, we compare his optimal profits in the CA and NCA games. The results are illustrated in Figure 4 .
As we can see, cooperative advertising improves the retailer's profit in most parts of the feasibility domain as illustrated in Figure 4 (light blue-colored area). There are however two exceptions where cooperative advertising does not benefit the retailer (green-colored regions).
In these particular areas, either the retailer's promotion significantly damages sales in the next period (α < −0.82) and the intensity of competition between products is limited (θ < 0.45), or the intensity of competition is relatively high (θ ∈ (0.68, 0.7)) and the retailer's promotions heavily damages long-term sales. As previously discussed in the case of the manufacturers, for relatively differentiated products, the first-period demands decrease when manufacturers support retail promotions that substantially harm long-term sales. In addition, while the retailer increases his first-period prices in the CA game, his margins decrease. The combination of smaller first-period demands and margins in the CA game hurts the overall profits of the retailer. On the other hand, there is another region in the feasible domain in which the manufacturer would prefer playing the NCA game, while the retailer will prefer the CA game (region R 4 ).
In this region, the intensity of competition is relatively high (θ ∈ (0.56, 0.68)) regardless of the nature of the long-term effects of the retailer's promotion. Remember that, within the feasible domain, regardless of the intensity of competition between the two products, the retailer always welcomes cooperative advertising when his promotions can increase long-term sales. From the manufacturers' perspective, however, supporting retailer's promotions that can expand next period demand when the products are highly substitutable may erode margins and negatively affect profits.
Effects of cooperative advertising programs on the total channel's profits
We now assess the impact of cooperative advertising programs for the entire channel by comparing the total channel profits in the CA and NCA games. Figure 6 offers an illustration of our findings. Contrasting Figures 5 and 6 , one can see that when channel members act so as to maximize their individual profits, the decisions to offer or accept a cooperative advertising program may deviate from those that maximize the overall channel profits. Profit-maximizing manufacturers may consider offering cooperative programs for some specific values of the parameters within this area (θ ∈ (0.15, 0.4)) that generate net losses for the retailer and for the entire channel (region R 3 in Figure 5 ). On the other hand, in all other areas within the feasible domain, cooperative advertising programs create channel surpluses, but again they may not align the interests of all channel members. For instance, when the intensity of competition is relatively high (θ ∈ (0.56, 0.68)), the manufacturers find it optimal not to offer cooperative advertising programs at the expense of the retailer who mainly benefits from these programs (region R 4 in Figure 5 ).
In such a context, the retailer would have to offer side payments to manufacturers to convince them to offer cooperative advertising. Side payments are possible because channel surpluses generated by cooperative advertising programs are collected by the retailer. In the automotive industry, some manufacturers have already adopted this type of side payments. For example, Hyundai charges its dealers an average of $500 on each new-vehicle invoice to pay for its advertising activities. On the other hand, in areas where cooperative advertising programs lead to losses for the retailer that are higher than the manufacturers' gains, the cooperative advertising program will not be accepted by the retailer, and therefore cannot be implemented. Comparing the optimal profits of the players from the two models, we identified the conditions under which the manufacturers should offer and the retailer should accept cooperative advertising programs. These conditions depend both on the long-term effects of retail promotions and on the intensity of competition between the two products. Particularly, within the feasible domain, the retailer always welcomes cooperative advertising programs regardless of the degree of product substitutability when promotions do not heavily damage future sales, while, depending on the degree of product substitutability, the manufacturers may or may not offer cooperative advertising programs regardless of the long-term effects of retail promotions.
Effectiveness of cooperative advertising for asymmetric manu-
We also find that channel members' decisions with respect to cooperative advertising may not benefit the total channel by aligning their interests with the objective of the entire channel. In some areas of the feasible domain, the manufacturers' or retailer's decisions may not lead to the maximization of the total channel profits. Finally, based on the principle of individual rationality, it is known that cooperative advertising arrangements are implemented only if they improve or, at least, do not damage the profits of any party involved compared to the situation where they are not offered. We have proven here that the decisions to offer and participate in a cooperative advertising program based on individual rationality may not serve the interest of the channel taken as an entity.
Particularly, the manufacturers and retailer may refuse to respectively offer and participate in cooperative advertising programs that enhance total channel profits. This indicates that reaping the benefits of cooperative advertising in the configuration studied in this paper may require either the use of additional side payment mechanisms that can better align the interest of channel members, or to control some market parameters. For instance, manufacturers may ask the retailer to share the cooperative advertising surplus via various payments.
Some auto makers ask for the retailer's contributions to advertising, while also offering cooperative advertising programs. The manufacturers may also prevent the retailer from engaging in promotional activities that can damage their brands. In fact, many manufacturers set specific eligibility criteria for their cooperative advertising programs. The manufacturers may also invest in marketing efforts that aim at increasing the differentiation of their products. This can reduce their reliance on retail promotions and better align channel members' interests.
This research has some limitations. We have used simplified models to derive meaningful results that can enhance our understanding of the use of cooperative advertising in channels.
Even with these simplified models, we obtained complex analytical findings that we could only graphically illustrate. Future researchers can relax some of our assumptions to study other relevant aspects of the problem overlooked here. For example, the manufacturers can directly invest in advertising to influence the degree of substitutability of their products. The retailer can also advertise and the manufacturers can support retail promotions in the second period. Competition can be added at the retail level. Finally, demand uncertainty could be added as in some recent works (e.g., Tsao 2015). All these issues deserve further research.
Appendix
We obtain feedback equilibrium solutions using backwards induction for two games. The first game is a benchmark situation, denoted hereafter by the superscript NCA, where manufacturers withhold cooperative advertising support to the retailer (s i = 0, i = 1, 2). In the second game, the manufacturers offer cooperative advertising at a rate s i = 0 (i = 1, 2). This game is denoted hereafter by the superscript CA. Next, we present the method for obtaining the equilibrium for each game.
Benchmark game: No cooperative advertising Proposition 1 The equilibrium strategies for the benchmark game where no cooperative advertising is implemented in the channel are given by
where p 
where
denotes the retailer's second-period profits and d i2 is the second-period demand function for product i given in (1) and (2) for the first and second products, respectively.
The solution to problem (8) gives the retailer's reaction functions, that is, p 12 and p 22 , as functions of the wholesale prices, w 12 and w 22 , and of the retailer's advertising in the first period, a 11 and a 21 .
The retailer's second-period profit is a strictly concave function of his decision variables in this period, p 12 and p 22 . From the first-order optimality conditions for the problem in (8),
the following expressions can be derived:
Third stage: At this stage of the game, the manufacturers play a Nash game between them and choose their second-period wholesale prices, w 12 and w 22 , in order to maximize their second-period profits. Therefore, the problem that manufacturer i is facing can be written as:
denotes manufacturer i's second-period profit and d i2 is the demand function in this period, defined in (1) and (2) for the first and second products, respectively. At this stage of the game, the manufacturers know the retailer's pricing reaction functions derived in Stage 4, and incorporate this information when deciding their optimal pricing strategies. We then replace the retail prices by the obtained reaction functions in (9) and (10) in the manufacturers' objective functions in (11) .
The solution to the manufacturers' problems gives us the wholesale prices, w 12 and w 22 , as functions of the retailer's advertising in the first period, a 11 and a 21 .
The manufacturers' second-period profit functions are strictly concave in their decision variables in this period, w 12 and w 22 . From the first-order conditions for each manufacturer i's problem in (11), we get:
Replacing these expressions into the retailer's reaction functions in (9) and (10), we obtain the second-period retail prices as a function of the retailer's advertising in the first period (a 11
and a 21 ) as follows:
The second-period retailer's and manufacturers' optimal profits are obtained replacing the expressions (12) , (13), (14) and (15) . They are given by
Second stage: In the first period, the retailer chooses the retail prices, p 11 and p 21 and his promotional efforts, a 11 and a 21 , in order to maximize his total profits, R, given by the discounted sum of his first and second period profits as follows:
where 0 < t R ≤ 1 is the retailer's discount rate. We assume it is equal to 1 for simplicity and without loss of generality.
Taking into account the second-period retailer's profits (given by (16)), the retailer's total profit is:
It can be easily proved that the retailer's total profit in the first and second periods, R, is a concave function in the retailer's first-period decision variables, p 11 , p 21 , and a 11 , a 21 if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
The conditions above ensure the concavity of the function R. Next, we maximize R with respect to the first-period retailer's decisions, p 11 , p 21 , a 11 and a 21 , to get the optimal reaction functions, i.e., the first-period retail prices, p 11 and p 21 , and the retailer's promotional efforts, a 11 and a 21 , as functions of the first-period wholesale prices, w 11 and w 21 :
First stage:
The manufacturers take into account the retailer's reaction functions in the first period when playing the Nash game between them. In period 1, manufacturer i chooses her wholesale price, w i1 , in order to maximize her total profits, M , during the first and second periods:
where 0 < t M ≤ 1 is the manufacturers' discount rate. We assume it is equal to 1 for simplicity and without loss of generality as in the case of the retailer.
Taking into account the second-period manufacturers' profits (given by (17) and (18)), manufacturer i's total profits during the first and second periods are as follows:
It can be easily proved that manufacturer i's total profits in the first and second periods, 
Replacing the first-period retailer's reaction functions obtained in Stage 2 in manufacturer i's total profit, M i , and taking into account the above condition to ensure the concavity of M i , we then obtain the manufacturers' optimality conditions as follows:
and the first-period manufacturers' strategies can be derived. We get
where w NCA 1 is given by (7) .
Taking into account the symmetric results in (21), (19) and (20) by (5) in (12), (13), (14), (15) , the expressions in (4) and (3) are easily deduced.
The cooperative advertising game Proposition 2
The equilibrium strategies for the cooperative advertising game where a cooperative advertising is implemented in the channel is given by the following two solutions.
, (25) 
(s 
Proof. It can be immediately shown that the fourth and third stages are identical to those in the proof of Proposition 1 and therefore, they are omitted here.
Second stage:
In the first period, the retailer chooses the retail prices, p 11 and p 21 and his promotional efforts, a 11 and a 21 , in order to maximize his total profits over the first and second periods:
where the discount rate applied to future profits has been fixed to 1.
Taking into account the second-period retailer's profit (given by (16) ), the retailer's total profit during the first and second periods is as follows:
It can be easily proved that the retailer's total profit function, R, is concave in his firstperiod decision variables, p 11 , p 21 , and a 11 , a 21 if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
Taking into account the above conditions, and maximizing R with respect to the retailer's first-period decisions p 11 , p 21 , and a 11 , a 21 , we get the optimal retail prices and promotional efforts as functions of the first-period wholesale prices, w 11 and w 21 :
First stage: The manufacturers take into account the retailer's reaction functions in the first period and play Nash to choose the wholesale prices in period 1, w 11 and w 21 . Manufacturer i maximizes her total profit M i given by the sum of her profits obtained in periods 1 and 2 such as:
where the manufacturers' discount rate has been fixed again at 1.
Taking into account the second-period manufacturers' profits (given by (17) and (18)), manufacturer i's total profit earned in both periods is
With the help of Mathematica 10.1 we can deduce the conditions ensuring that the man- Given the symmetric structure of the game for the manufacturers, the above system of four equations simplifies as a system of two equations. From the first equation one can get the first-period wholesale price as a function of s 1 as shown in (26) . Substituting this last expression into the other optimality condition, a non-linear equation in variable s 1 is obtained which admits different solutions. We removed the solutions that imply a null promotional investment and three possibilities for the first-period manufacturers' strategies are derived.
One of these solutions is removed because it does not satisfy the concavity conditions in (29) and (30) . Finally, two possibilities for s 1 remain feasible and their expressions are reported in (27) and (28) . The remainder optimal expressions (22) , (23), (24), (25) can easily be obtained taking into account the symmetric manufacturers' first-period optimal strategies. We then get two optimal solutions for the CA game (Scenario I and Scenario II).
As we can see in Figure 1 , both solutions (Scenarios I and II) are feasible in the red region of Figure 1 . In order to identify the equilibrium solution in this region, we proceed to comparing the total profits obtained over both periods by each channel member and by the total channel. Analytical results are graphically represented similarly to Figures 1 to 6. We omit these figures for ease of illustration.
We compare the optimal manufacturers' profits obtained in Scenarios I and II and find that the manufacturers prefer Scenario I in most of the feasible domain where both scenarios are feasible. Scenario II is preferred by manufacturers whenever product substitutability is very low and the long term effect of the retailer's promotions are not too high. It is also preferred when the market is characterized by high substitutability (0.5 < θ < 0.6) and α is very low. This is the solution used in the paper.
We also compare the optimal retailer's profit obtained in Scenarios I and II and find that the retailer prefers the solution in Scenario II in most of the feasible domain where both scenarios are feasible. An exception is noted in the region where product substitutability (θ) levels are very high, in which case Scenario I is preferred by the retailer.
Given these dissimilar preferences for Scenarios I and II by the manufacturers and the retailer, we study conditions on the model parameters for which the channel members have similar and dissimilar preferences for Scenarios I and II. We find that the retailer and manufacturers will prefer different solutions in two cases. In the first case, the manufacturers prefer Finally, we compare optimal total channel profits in Scenarios I and II in the CA game.
The results show that Scenario I (II) is optimal for low (high) levels of θ whenever both Scenarios are feasible. These comparisons show that while the manufacturers are the channel leaders and therefore will implement their preferred equilibrium solution opportunistically, the total channel profit might suffer from such a strategy. In particular, the total channel profit can be higher when the retailer's preferred equilibrium is implemented, mainly when the market is characterized by low enough substitutability levels (low θ). This suggests that the CA game can lead to Pareto-inefficient results. This is a new finding that has not been observed so far in the literature studying cooperative advertising using static games with no manufacturing competition.
Comparisons of the optimal decision variables, retailer's optimal margins and demands in the different games
In all feasible domain where both games are feasible, we find p 
